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Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
V. 
KEVIN ALLEN BOYCE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Nature of the Case 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Docket No. 39961 
Ada County No. CR-FE-2011-
0006515 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Kevin Allen Boyce appeals from the district court's Order of Revocation of 
Probation, Imposition of Sentence and Commitment (R., pp. 69-71 ); in which the district 
court imposed and executed a sentence of ten (10) years with the first three (3) years of 
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said term to be fixed, and the remaining seven (7) years of said term to be 
indeterminate, after Mr. Boyce admitted violating his probation. Mr. Boyce asserts that, 
in light of the unique facts of this case, the revocation of probation and imposition of 
sentence is excessive and an abuse of discretion. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Boyce was at the time of the imposition of sentence, a 41 year old man with 
no previous felony record (PSI pg.1, 4-7). Mr. Boyce was remorseful about his crime 
and participation in the incident, stating he knew what he did was wrong. (PSI 12-13). 
Mr. Boyce had completed a retained jurisdiction, then a second retained 
jurisdiction, and had been placed on probation. Mr. Boyce did well on that second 
retained jurisdiction, and had responded well to the additional attention to his mental 
health issues through programming. (Tr. 5/10/12, Pgs. 17-18.). 
When sentence was imposed at the probation violation hearing, counsel for Mr. 
Boyce argued for another retained jurisdiction as the proper sentence given the 
violations that essentially resulted from miscommunication between Mr. Boyce and his 
probation officer, and the fact that he was homeless. (Tr. 5/10/12, pgs. 22-23). In the 
alternative, Mr. Boyce argued for a reduction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35 to one 
year fixed, five years indeterminate. (Tr., 5/10/12, pg. 23, Lines 14-18). 
The PSI investigator had originally recommended local jail, with the opportunity 
to participate in substance abuse, and active behavioral change programming in the 
Ada County Jail. (PSI 13). 
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Despite the above factors, the district court sentenced Mr. Boyce to ten (10) 
years with the first three (3) years of said term to be fixed, and the remaining seven (7) 
years of said term to be indeterminate. (R., pp. 69-71.). 
Mr. Boyce filed a Motion for Reduction of Sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 
35. (R., pp.203-204.). The District Court denied Mr. Boyce's motion without hearing. 
(R., pp.211-217.). 
ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Boyce due process and equal protection 
when it denided his motion to augment the appellate record with transcripts 
necessary for review of the issues on appeal? 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked probation and issue an 
excessive sentence? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied r. Richards's Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Boyce Due Process And Equai Protection When 
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Transcripts Necessary For 
Review Of Issues On Appeal 
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In this case, Mr. Boyce filed a Motion to Augment, requesting transcripts of the 
Change of Plea hearing held on June 2, 2011, and the rider review hearing held on 
June 2, 2011, that request was denied by the Supreme Court. On appeal, Mr. Boyce is 
challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for the transcripts. Mr. 
Boyce asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issue of whether the 
district court abused its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Boyce and when itdenied Mr. 
Boyce's oral Rule 35 motion because the applicable standard of review requires an 
appellate court to conduct an independent review of the entirety of the proceedings in 
order to evaluate the district court's sentencing decisions. Therefore, the Idaho 
Supreme Court erred in denying his request. 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Boyce With Access 
To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process And Equal 
Protection Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Apr1eliate Review Of 
His Sentencing Claims 
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. 
art. I §13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
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of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981). Const. 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 ( 1991) ( overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States 
Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dept. of 
Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. 
See I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a 
relevant transcript, the transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); 
I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 
mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. 
I.C.R. 5.2(a). Further; "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding 
before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54. 7 further enables a district court to 
"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from 
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a). 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF Page 5 
An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion is an appeal of right as defined in 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (9). See State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891 (Ct. App. 1983) (an 
order denying a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is an appealable order 
pursuant to I.AR. 11 (c)(6)). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of opinions that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases. 
The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection 
clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants 
and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second theme limits the 
states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do 
not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request :n order to meet 
the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must 
provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless some or all of the 
requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. 1//inois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that time, 
the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been 
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase 
transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme 
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Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty 
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as 
follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
discriminations. 
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Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent de:'endant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. The 
United States Supreme Court ruled that "once the State chooses to establish appellate 
review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that 
procedure because of their poverty." Id. at 257. "This principle is no less applicable 
where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its 
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of that 
procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under 
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of 
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. at 494. The Court first expanded upon its statement in 
Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is 
available, by adding a relevancy requirement stating that "part or all of the stenographic 
transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the appeal, and a 
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State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such circumstances." Id. 
at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for appeal by the 
defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The Court ultimately 
concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be adequately reviewed 
without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If a review 
of the appellate record establishes a need for the requested transcripts it becomes the 
State's burden to prove that the requested transcripts are not necessary for the appeal. 
Id. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct App. 
2007). 
The requested transcripts are necessary for review of the issue raised in this 
appeal because they are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of review. The 
requested transcripts are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review all 
proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court made 
appropriate sentencing determinations. "When we review a sentence that is ordered 
into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record 
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encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our review upon 
the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between 
the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 
26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added). In other words, an appellate court reviewing 
a district court's sentencing decision conducts an independent review of the entire 
record to determine if the record supports the district court's decisions. This standard of 
review is necessary in Idaho because judges are not required to state their sentencing 
rationale on the record. State v. Nield, 106 Idaho 665, 666 (1984). 
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation 
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863). In that case, a transcript was 
necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the 
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an 
adequate record or face default. "It is well established that an appellant 
bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can 
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record 
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court." 
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 
422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 
(Ct. App. 1985)). If transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes, that 
may be sufficient so that a meaningful review of an appellant's claim is possible, then 
transcripts are not necessary for appellate review, even though thi-:: Idaho Court of 
Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel not rely on the district court 
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minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 
Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Boyce fails to provide the appellate court with 
transcripts necessary for review of his claim, the legal presumption will apply and 
Mr. Boyce's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action alone 
which prevents him from access to the necessary items, then such action is a violation 
of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer apply. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 153 
Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), which addressed the scope of review of a revocation of 
probation order. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on 
probation. Id. at 619. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating 
the terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation, but retained 
jurisdiction. Id. at 619-620. After he completed his rider, the district court placed the 
defendant on probation. Id. at 620. The defendant subsequently admitted to violating 
the terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation. Id. The defendant 
appealed from the district court's second order revoking probation. Id. 
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with 
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, \Vhich was denied 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the 
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal 
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district 
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 620-621. The Idaho Court 
of Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not 
necessary for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second 
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probation violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its 
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 621. 
The Court of Appeals then clarified the scope of review for a revocation determination. 
Specifically it held: 
[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily 
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that a// 
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane. 
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues 
which are properly made part of the record on appeal. 
Id. (original emphasis). 
Morgan is distinguishable because Morgan was challenging the order revoking 
probation and Mr. Boyce is challenging the length of his sentence, which entails an 
analysis of "the entire record encompassing events before and after the original 
judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed 
as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of 
probation." Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Furthermore, whether the transcripts of the 
requested proceedings were before the district court at the time of the probation 
revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether the transcripts are relevant to the 
issues on appeal because, in reaching a sentencing decision, a district court is not 
limited to considering only that information offered at the hearing from which the appeal 
is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own official 
position and observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367. 373-74 (Ct. App. 
2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings 
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of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard during the 
trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could rely upon 
"the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the 
courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. 
Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing court's reliance upon 
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously dismissed case 
because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he al,2::,dy knew about 
Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior hearings were transcribed or not 
is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon the information it already knows from 
presiding over the prior hearings when it made the decision to revoke probation. 
The rationale behind this position makes perfect sense in light of State v. Adams 
115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989), where the Court of Appeals explained why 
the appellate courts should look to the entire record when reviewing the executed 
sentence: 
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has 
been revoked, 'Ne examine the entire record encompassing ever;ts before 
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two 
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution 
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially 
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The 
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events 
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing 
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a 
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sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant ~1.as scant 
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked, 
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an 
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the 
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on 
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a 
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a 
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. \Ne see 
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the 
appellate system cluttered with such cases. 
As such, when an appellate files an appeal from a sentence ordered after the revocation 
of probation the applicable standard of review requires an independ a 
compr3hensive inquiry to the events which occurred prior to, as well as, the events 
which occurred during the probation revocation proceedings. The basis for this 
standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite properly remembers the 
entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision." Id. The 
Court of Appeals then stated that, "When reviewing that decision, we should consider 
the same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not state that the district court must 
expressly reference the prejudgment events at the probation disposition hearing in order 
for this standard of review to become applicable. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals 
assumed the judge will automatically consider the prejudgment events when 
determining whether probation should be revoked. Whether the prior hearings were 
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transcribed or not is irrelevant, as an appellate court will assume that the district court 
will remember the events from the prior proceedings when it ultimately revokes 
probation. 
In this case, the Honorable Mike Wetherell presided over the proceedings 
throughout. As such, the Adams opinion indicates that an appellate court will presume 
the district court relied on its memory of those proceedings when it r1:,·.1oked probation. 
Therefore, transcripts of those hearings will be necessary for an appellate court to 
review the merits of his sentencing claim. 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts necessary for 
a merits-based review on appeal. The requested transcripts are relevant to the issues 
on appeal because the applicable standard of review of the denial of a Rule 35 motion 
requires the appellate court to conduct an independent review of all of the proceedings 
before the district court. Under this standard of review, the focus is not on the district 
·court's express· sentencing·rationale; to·the··contrary,the qtJestion····off appeal is· if. the 
record itself supports the district court's ultimate sentencing decision. As such, the 
decision to deny Mr. Boyce's request for the transcripts will render his appeal ineffective 
because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts support the district court's 
sentencing decisions. This functions as a procedural bar to the review of Mr. Boyce"s 
appellate sentencing claims on the merits and, therefore, he should either be provided 
with the requested transcripts or the presumption should not be applied. 
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2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Bcvce With Access 
To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process Because 
He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants 
the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the Court 
recognized a due process right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. According 
to the United States Supreme Court: 
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts,469 U.S. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
suppo1 his client's appeal to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 
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Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the 
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is 
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor of any 
argument made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Boyce has not obtained 
review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with effective 
assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of 
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal 
Justice, The Defense Function. These standards offer insight into the role and 
responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation-of thequestionstharrnighfhepresehted on appeai~Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
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presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's 
decision to deny his oral Rule 35 motion. Further, counsel is unable to advise 
Mr. Boyceon the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal. 
Mr. Boyce is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant 
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Boyce his 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection which include a right to 
effective assistance of counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be 
provided with access to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity 
to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of 
that review. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Probation and imposed an 
Excessive Sentence. 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Boyce's history, and the facts of this case, present mitigating circumstances 
indicating a need for temperance in sentencing. Nevertheless, the district court 
imposed six years upon Mr. Boyce. Mr. Boyce asserts that the distnct court failed to 
adequately consider the mitigating factors and, thus, abused its discretion, considering 
Mr. Boyce's lack of criminal history and his personal circumstances. 
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B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Sentence Of Ten 
Years, Three Fixed And Seven Indeterminate Upon Mr. Boyce. 
Mr. Boyce asserts that, given any view of the facts, the revocation of his 
probation and his sentence is excessive for his charge and record. VVhere a defendant 
contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence the 
appellate court conducts an independent review of the record, giving consideration to 
the na~ure of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public 
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 653 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1982). The 
Idaho Supreme Court states: 
the general objectives of sentence review are: 
i) to correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having regard to 
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection 
of the public interest; 
(ii) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by affording him an 
opportunity to assert grievances he may have regarding his sentence; 
(iii) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of the sentencing 
power and by increasing the fairness of the sentencing process; and 
(iv) to promote the development and application of criteria for sentencing 
which are both rational and just. 
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State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 144-145, 814 P.2d 401, 404-405 (1991 ), overruled 
on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992), (citing 
State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384-385, 582 P.2d 728, 730-731 (1978) and quoting ABA 
Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences at 7 (Approved Draft 1968)). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has further held, '"[w]here a sentence is within 
statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on 
the part of the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294, 
939 P.2d 1372, 1373 (1997), quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71, 
75 (1979). Mr. Boyce does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory 
maximum. Rather, Mr. Boyce contends that in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id., citing State v. 
Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141,145,814 P.2d 401,405 (1991), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992). The governing criteria, or 
09jective~ofcrimi11alpunish111eotare: (1) .. protection of _society;.(2)deterrence oLthe. 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of- rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id., quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 
582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). 
Although Mr. Boyce's history presented mitigating circumstances and reasons for 
mercy, the court sentenced this man to a 1 o year unified sentence. Mr. Boyce was at 
the time of sentencing a 20 year old man with no previous felony record. (PSI p.1 ). 
Additionally, the issue of reducing a sentence because a defendant expresses 
remorse has been addressed in several cases. In State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 824 
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P.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1991 ), the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some leniency is 
required when the defendant has expressed "remorse for his conduct, his recognition of 
his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive 8ttributes of his 
character." Id. at 209, 824 P.2d at 140. Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a 
defendant's term of imprisonment because the defendant expressed regret for what he 
had done. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595, 651 P.2d 527, 529 (1982). In the 
present case, by the time of sentencing, Mr. Boyce, a man facing his first felony charge, 
had shown his remorse and wished for treatment. Despite his efforts, he could not 
qualify prior to the district court imposing sentence and denying his Rule 35 motion. 
Mr. Boyce was at the time of the imposition of sentence, a 41 year old man with 
no previous felony record (PSI pg.1, 4-7). Mr. Boyce was remorseful about his crime 
and participation in the incident, stating he knew what he did was wrong. (PSI 12-13). 
Mr. Boyce had completed a retained jurisdiction, then a second retained 
jurisdiction, and had been placed on probation. Mr. Boyce did well on that second 
retained jurisdiction, and ·hadTesponded we11 ··10 the··additi6naI· attehtion·to Iii if men tar· 
health issues through programming. (Tr. 5/10/12, Pgs. 17-18.). 
When sentence was imposed at the probation violation hearing, counsel for Mr. 
Boyce argued for another retained jurisdiction as the proper sentence given the 
violations that essentially resulted from miscommunication between Mr. Boyce and his 
probation officer, and the fact that he was homeless. (Tr. 5/10/12, pgs. 22-23). In the 
alternative, Mr. Boyce argued for a reduction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35 to one 
year fixed, five years indeterminate. (Tr., 5/10/12, pg. 23, Lines 14-18). 
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The PSI investigator had originally recommended local jail, with the opportunity 
to participate in substance abuse, and active behavioral change programming in the 
Ada County Jail. (PSI 13). 
Despite the above factors, the district court sentenced Mr. Boyce to ten (10) 
years with the first three (3) years of said term to be fixed, and the remaining seven (7) 
years of said term to be indeterminate. (R., pp. 69-71.). 
A. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Boyce's Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 (Rule 35) Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence Because The Sentence Was 
Excessive As Initially Imposed 
Introduction 
Counsel for Mr. Boyce did-not present-any new information-in support-oHhe-Rule---
35 motion for a reduction of sentence, but simpiy argued via an oral motion under Rule 
35 for a reduction of sentence at the time sentence was imposed. Accordingly, Mr. 
Boyce asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied the motion 
because his sentence was excessive as initially imposed. 
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B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Boyce Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence Because The 
Sentence Was Excessive As Initially Imposed 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency that may 
be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 
Idaho 251, 253, 869 P.2d 568, 570 (Ct.App.1994), citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21, 
740 P.2d 63 (Ct.App.1987) and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 680 P.2d 869 
(Ct.App.1984). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are 
the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was 
reasonable." Id., citing Lopez, 106 Idaho a 450, 680 P.2d at 872. "If t:,a sentence was 
not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in 
view of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id., citing 
__ $_t9tfiV.: HemandezL 121Jdaho_l1A,.822_E2d_101 .'l_(CtApp.J99J.) __ _ 
-----·--------- ---Counsel-for-Mr;-Boyce-did-not-submit-any-new-information-or-clocamentatiorr·in 
support of his Rule 35 motion, other than that Mr. Boyce had not qualified for treatment. 
He hired an attorney that failed to file a motion to reconsider until too late, but the 
affidavit provided demonstrated his seriousness about treatment and overcoming his 
addictions. Therefore, he respectfully contends that the district court should have 
reduced his sentence pursuant to the oral Rule 35 motion because the sentence was 
excessive as imposed because the court should have allowed him tc attempt another 
retained jurisdiction in light of his living situation and addiction issues. His arguments in 
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support of this assertion are found in section ll(B) above, and need not be repeated. 
They are incorporated herein by reference. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Boyce respectfully requests that this court supplement the record as he has 
requested. Further he requests that the court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court 
for a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he requests that the ordei- denying his Rule 
35 motion be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this p day of April, 2013. 
STEPHEN D. THOMPSON 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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